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THE "THIRD MAN ARGUMENT" AND THE TEXT OF PARMENIDES
Robert G, Turnbull
The Ohio,State University
Gregory Vlastos' 1954 article[l]
on the so-called
"Third Man Argument" (henceforth, TMA) of Plato’s Parmenides
gave astonishing prominence to a short stretch of the text
of that dialogue, namely 132A1-B2, and elicited an equally
astonishing outpouring of sophisticated argument concerning
self-predication and related issues.[2] It is my intention
in this paper to place that bit of text in context in the
dialogue, attempting to show (a) that, though there are sim
ilarities,
it cannot, easily be identified with-anything
which Aristotle would have recognized as the TMA and
(b)
that most of the Vlastos-inspired controversy is irrelevant
to the interpretation of that text and its context.
It is
not my
intention therefore to enter the controversy but
rather
simply
to establish the irrelevance claim.
On the
way to establishing it,
it will be helpful to pause briefly
to inspect an implied argument at 130C which, when, made fulrly explicit,
is remarkably close to ;a TMA which Alexander
attributes to Polyxenus[3] and which has the minor virtue of
involving the (possible) form Man, not Large.
Part I will
set the stage for the argument at 132A1-B2. Part II will
attempt careful statement of that argument, implicitly
and
explicitly criticizing the statement(s) of it by Vlastos and
some , of his critics. Part III will deal briefly with Aris
totle's most extended statement of the TMA in Sophistical
Refutations!41 in
the interest of distinguishing
it from
that of
Parmenides 132. In Part IV, the conclusion, I-shall
attempt
brief and schematic summation of the first three
parts. ...
Part^'f: PARMENIDES 127E-130E4. THE OPENING ARGUMENTS
After
preliminaries,
the dialogue proper begins with
SocratesV restatement of an argument of Zeno which, by modus
tollens, concludes that "it is impossible for the beings to
be many" (127E7).
In literal translation, the argument
is
as follows:
Z.

If the beings [or those which are] are many, then
they must be likes and unlikes.
But it is impossible for them to be both likes and
unlikes.
So it is impossible for the beings to be many.

Assuring

himself

that the whole point of

Zeno's

treatise
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(read aloud
to an assembled company before the dialogue
proper begins) was to establish the above conclusion, Socra
tes expresses surprise at discovering Zeno’s book to be in
defense of Parmenides’ doctrine— a defense of ”No Many” com
plementing Parmenides’ ’’One” . He then proceeds to a rebut
tal of Z, giving a response which attempts (i) to immunize
the Platonic
forms from Z^ and (ii) to render harmless
the
application of Z to individuals or "visibles” which are said
to "participate in" or "have shares of" the forms.
The
immunization proceeds with the claim that there is
no sense of ’i s ’ in which a form is^ anything
but simply,
solely,
and self-identically itself (cf. especially
129D3E2).
Though Likeness and Unlikeness, One and Multitude
(Socrates' examples) are "opposites", each is separately and
indivisibly what it is.
Each is thus, as being the form it
is,
just that, and none "is" one or more of the others.
So
no argument of the Z-type can have application to the forms,
for the protasis of Z *s conditional premiss can have no
application
to a form or forms.
In what Socrates takes
to
be any relevant sense, the forms are not many.
The
application
of Z to individuals or "visibles"
is
rendered harmless
by Socrates’ insistence that
any given
individual
may be both like and unlike, one and many,
etc.
without
contradiction or paradox.
This is possible, he in
sists,
because an individual "is" like and unlike, one and
many,
etc., only in virtue of having shares of (metechein)
Likeness
and Unlikeness, One and Multitude, etc.
Thus,
in
his example,
Socrates may have a share of One (as "being"
one man)
and also of Multitude (as ’'being" his parts)
and
thus "participationally" or "sharingly be" one and many.
It
is not the case that the individual is. anything but itself,
and there is no Zenonian restriction on having♦
And so, if anyone undertakes with such examples to
show that the the same things are many and also
one— stones,
sticks,
and the like— we shall say
that he demonstrates that a given thing can be
both many and one, but not that One is Many nor
that Many is One. What he says is not at all sur
prising,
but only what we should all agree
to
(129D2-6).
So in this case the minor premiss of Z is denied applica
tion:
It is perfectly possible for individuals to "be" both
likes and unlikes by having shares of opposite forms.[5 ]
Neither Zeno nor Parmenides makes any attempt to chal
lenge Socrates’ logic.
If Socrates can make good his dis
tinction between forms which are what they are, on the one
side,
and participant
individuals which have shares of
forms, on the other side, and if tie can supply an intelligi
ble sense of ’have a share o f ’ (metechein with the genitive
of share),
he can (a) agree that, if beings (in this
case
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participant
ind ividuals) are many, then they must be
likes
and
unlikes but (b) deny that it is imp ossible for them
to
be both likes and unlikes.
Parmenides, who und e r t a k e s
the
questioning
of Socrates, quite naturally begins by
asking
about
the distinction and shortly turns to asking a b o u t the
intelligible sense.
His first 'questions inquire whether So cr ate s will m a i n 
tain
the separation (cho r i s m o s ) between p a r tic ip ant
indi-*
viduals and
their "shares" on the one side and
the
forms
themselves
on the other for several varieties of forms.
In
putting his first
question, Parmenides assume s
that
the
"shares" fall on the side of the participant i n d i v i d u a l s and
are quite distinct and separated from the relev ant forms.
.And does
it seem to you that there
is
likeness
Itself separate from the likeness we have, and One
and Many and all of the others of whic h you
just
now heard Zeno speak? (130B 3-5)
Using schematic letters and subscripts for forms, sha re s o f
forms, and participant individuals, the pattern s u g g e s t e d by
Parmenides'
questions (as well as later quest ions and a r g u 
ments)
can -be made to stand· out.
Let *Fj ! ,
'Ü 2 ’ > etc. be
used for forms . 'f χ * ’fp ’ » etc . be used
for
shar es , and
*3ci ',
'x,2
etc. be u s e d r o r participant
i n d i v i d u a l s . So,
in the above quotation, Parmenides is asking (for
certain
forms) whether, whenever there is some value of IT whi ch some
value of jc has, there is also a value of E whi ch is s e p a r a t e
from
the
value of f. which the value
of x_ has as
a
share.
(Notes
It will be assumed that values of F and val ue s Of i . ■·
which have common subscripts are related as are, e.g., L i k e 
ness Itself and the likeness we have.)
Parmenides' first question concerns forms for likeness,
one,
many,
and the others mentioned
or h i g hli gh ted by
thé
Zeno
treatise. It is difficult to give a defini te
charac
terization
to these so as to· expose the princ iple of
their
grouping..
Since it is not strictly needed for the p u r p o s e s
of the. present paper, I shall only hint a t wha t I thin k
is
the proper way to state the principle and add some c l a r i f i 
cation in
a footnote.
The hint is that the forms
in
the
list are forms which participant individuals hav e shares of
only in virtue of their having shares of yet other
forms,
thus two participant individuals may have shares of L i k e n e s s
Itself
only in virtue of having shares of, say. Jus t i c e I t 
self or Largeness Itself.
This is, of course, only a hint,
and it needs refinement: to take counter exampl es into
ac
count. [6 ] But the present purpose demands only the d i s t i n c 
tions
already
made between forms, shares, and
participant
individuals·
And:Parmenides ’ question asks only about
the
assumption
of a farm, separate f rom the
share
and /o r the
participant individual. And Socrates' answer is a f f i r m a t i v e
for the, forms -highlighted in Zeno 's treatise'.
Parmenides''

second

question asks about
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Noble Itself (Kalon), Good Itself, "and the like", separated
from justice, nobility, and goodness "in us".
So that
for
these, as well as the Zenonian examples, whenever there is a
value of _f which some value of x has, there is always a
value of F which the value of x has a share of and,
by so
having a share, has the value of f,.
Parmenides’ third question changes the pattern remarka
bly and offers a serious challenge to Socrates’ response to
Zeno.
The question is:
And what about a form of man, separate from us and
from all others
like us— a form of man,
or of
fire, or of water? (130C 1-2).
Here
the question is not?
Is there a value of I?, separate
from the value of _f which a value of x has? It is rather:
Is there a value of F separate from a givèn value of x?
Socrates
responds to this question by saying that he has
been "often in an aporia [straits, puzzlement, no way out]
concerning
these whether one must speak of them in the same
way or in some different way."
And, of course, for the as
sumptions made in his response to Zeno, there is an aporia.
DIGRESSION·. PARMENIDES' THIRD QUESTION AND THE TMA
This
third question of Parmenides obviously
concerns
sortal,
"substance", or thing-kind forms (ignoring fire and
water
for a moment), and the rationale for Socrates'
reply
to Zeno is hardly appropriate for them.
I think that there
is reason to believe that the reply to Zeno and the doctrine
of Phaedo which that reply echoes is grounded
in Plato's
attempt
to give an intelligible sense to sentences of the
form
'_x is f_'. The problem of giving such a sense arises
from the difficulties of 'is':. If one takes the 'is' in '_x
is f ' as requiring that both 'x' and
’f_' name
the same
thing,[7]
it is hard to avoid construing all such sentences
as stating some sort of identity and thus falling into
thé
hands of Zeno and Parmenides.
As we have noted, the idea of
Phaedo
and Socrates' reply to Zeno seems clearly to be the
construal
of
'jç is JE_' as ?x has Τ' , thus avoiding the
identity
problem.
With this construal, the treatment
of
values of £ as shares of F (The F Itself) is natural enough,
especially with the verb, 'metechein'. with its genitive of
share ready at han d.
Before directly engaging Parmenides' third question, it
will help to say something about values of 'F'
and their
predications.
It has been often noted that Plato, in Phae
do , not only allows but insists upon the truth of sentences
having the form of 'The Beautiful Itself is beautiful'.
And
he insists
that The Beautiful Itself is really beautiful,
whereas Helen, say, is only humdrumly beautiful, indeed is
both beautiful
and not beautiful.
The problems of coping
with this insistence are notorious, and we shall advert to
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them again later.
I shall, however, ignore the large liter___a-tiuro— “o n _ijt....a-nd simply claim that, even for the Plato
of
Phaedo and Socrates' reply to Zeno, the proper way to con
strue sentences of the form 'F is F (or f)' is 'F is What it
is to be. F' . So understood. The Beautiful Itself is taken
out of the beauty contest with Helen and is really beautiful
in the sense that, as what it is to be beautiful, it is the
very essence of the beautiful, whereas Helen is only a beau*tiful thing, i.e., a participant individual which has a
share of The Beautiful Itself.[8 ]
The problem raised by Parmenides* third question
is:
How shall we construe, e .g ., 'Jones is a man'?
(Attic
Greek, having no indefinite article, makes the point slight
ly more difficult to see, for it would give us
'Jones is
man'
and thus the form of 'x, is f.' .) As we have seen, the
genius of the Phaedo doctrine and that of Socrates' reply to
Zeno
is that it construes sentences of the form 'x is f' as
'.X has f ’ , but this will hardly do for 'Jones is a man 1For the sentence would then be construed as ’Jones has
(a)
man' .;
But Jones may have a likeness or a wise in him,
but
he can hardly have a man in him. ' Indeed, he is a m a n .[9]
if one forsakes the has construal of predication
for
But
participant, individuals (in -the·· case of sortais), the iden
tity problems of Zeno and Parmenides loom large again.
As
Parmenides puts the question: Is Socrates prepared to accept
a form Man in addition to us and others like us not in ad
dition to the man we have (the parallel to the likeness wè
have)?
The doctrine of Phaedo and Socrates’ reply
seems
reasonably well
suited to characterizing
forms
but ill
suited indeed to sortal forms.
Fleshing out: the implied argument which leads Socrates
into aporia on this matter appears to give us a TMA:
If *L1 is·, a man by virtue of having a share of The
Man Itself,
then it must have a share
(i.e.,
a
man)
in i t . But it would seem that j q , to be a
value of x. at all, must be à man (or a horse, cow,
tree, or whatever).
Given this and given that The
Man itself is man in the sense of What it is to be
a Man, then the having a share account requires a
redundant
and unnecessary third man
(viz;,
the
share of The Man Itself).
So put, the argument looks remarkably similar to one attri
buted to the Sophist Polyxenus and quoted by Alexander Aphrodisias in the latter's comment on an Aristotelian allusion
to the TMA at Metaphysics 990b 15:
If a man .is by partaking of or having a Share of
the form or The Man Itself, there must be some man
who . will have being in relation to the form.
But
neither The Man Itself, which is a form, nor any
given man is. by partaking of a form.
Some other
5
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is left to be a third man having being in relation
to the form.
Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics » 62,29-33
As we shall see in Part III, this is not Aristotle’s
TMA as found in Sophistical Refutations
178b37-179all.
Though laying great stress on the individual or the tode t i ,
Aristotle's TMA generates an infinite regress.
The Polyxenus argument does not, though it is directly
relevant
to
this portion of Parmenides. It should suffice here to point
out 'that the implied argument of Parmenides' third question
introduces
the difference between sortal and other
forms,
brings on a Socratic expression of bewilderment, and invites
a formulation like that of the Polyxenus quotation from Al
exander .
It is difficult
to comment on the
fire and water
portion of Parmenides' third question.
That they are listed
rather
simply with man suggests that Plato links together
what Strawson
calls "bulk” or "stuff" terms with
sortais. \
Their
presence
in the list suggests that Plato does not
think of the "shares" of the forms doctrine
as physical
parts or pieces öf participant individuals.
Both fire and
water admit
in Attic Greek of sortal-style use as subject
terms with the definite article in either the singular
or
the plural.
One might, with that in mind, think of Third
Fire or Third Water arguments.
But any extended comment on
the passage would be idling for the present paper.
THE UPSHOT OF THE EARLY ARGUMENTS
Parmenides'
fourth question concerns forms for "hair,
mud,
dirt, or any other vile and worthless thing."
Is Soc
rates
in straits (aporiaV about them too?
Despite
their
offering, as sortal-like things the same problem as fire and
water,
Socrates
professes no difficulty with them.
There
are no forms for them;
"they are just such as we see (horopien) them to be" (130D 3).
It's difficult to make out this
comment,
and it is tempting to think of it as giving
such
things the status given to colors, sounds, etc. in Theaetetus and Timaeus, i.e., as existing only relative
to the
interaction of our sensory organs and the "outside" physical
world.[10]
Parmenides' immediately following comment, how
ever, suggests only that Socrates' ought not to despise such
things and that they ought to have the same status as water
and fire.
Before
turning to the arguments in the immediate
con
text of what is commonly taken to be the TMA, I wish to un
derline the major features of the account so far.
First,
Socrates*
response to Zeno provides the obvious context for
understanding the first part of Parmenides. And that reply,
as we have seen, requires distinguishing what I have been
calling participant individuals, shares, and forms.
Second,
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the response requires thinking of *jç is f ' as 'x has £_* and
thinking of such having as having a share of a form.
Third,
since having is not the same as being (in a strict
sensé),
participant
individuals may have any number of
shares
of
quite different forms without those individuals having to be
likes and unlikes in any damaging way.
Fourth,
Socrates'
reply does not allow any form, to have a share of any other
form and, by virtue of this insulation from having
shares,
construes
each form as selfsame or as a single and, if you
please, isolated "being".
THE IMMEDIATE CONTEXT OF THE SOrCALLED TMA
At
130E6, Parmenides shifts from inquiry about what
sorts of things there are forms for to inquiry about having
a
share or shares (metechein or metalambanein) . The
focus
of his inquiry seems obviously to be the difficulty of sup
plying a sense to 'having a share' which preserves the claim
that
each form is selfsame or single.
Several senses are
considered,
all of which result in denial of that claim.
And,
if Socrates is forced to accept the conclusion that
each form is not single or selfsame, he must recognize that
his forms are entangled by Zeno's argument and that he has
not given a satisfactory reply.
To paraphrase Zeno's argu
ment:
if, a form is many, then it must be (in an invidious
sensé)
like and unlike. What I earlier called the 'immuni
zation*
of the forms will have failed.
What is more, if no
unobjectionable
sense can be given to 'have a share
or
shares',
the application of Z to individuals will not be
harmless,
i ,e., their being likes and unlikes will
trigger
Zeno's conclusion of "no many".
Parmenides
starts by noting.that Socrates' participant
individuals have
the names of the forms which they have
shares
of, thus what has a share of Likeness is a like and
what has a share of Largeness is a large (130E9-131A3). And
then .he. proceeds immediately to point out that the ordinary
meaning of
'have a share or shares' would seem to. require
that
anything which has a share either has the whole or a
part of that of which it has a share.
And the standard or,
if you please, literal meanings of. 'metechei n * and
'meta
lambanein 'fill have that same requirement.
If two different
things each have the whole of something as their
shares,
then it would seem obvious either that they don't really
have it or that what they have shares of is somehow divided
and thus not single and selfsame.
Socrates suggests that several different things may all
share
in the same day. Despite a number of commentators *
taking this seriously, I think they obviously misunderstand
the context.
That 'metechein' or 'metalambanein' may be so
used metaphorically is obvious.
The point is, however, that
Parmenides
is here, concentrating .on an ordinary or standard
meaning,
and the metaphorical meaning is simply out of
place.
He turns shortly to metaphorical meanings, but still
7
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encounters the difficulty of the form’s being many.
Despite
the impression created by this and several ar
guments
to follow, it should be noted that Plato takes this
first part of the dialogue as initiating a search for a
clear
sense of 'have a share or shares of' which will
save
some version of Plato's doctrine of forms and having shares
from the ”no many” consequence of Z. Parmenides' remark at
135B4-C2 is indication of that intent:
But,
if on the other hand anyone, fixing on these
and other
similar arguments, were to deny
that
there
are forms of the beings, not marking out a
form for each one of them, he will have nowhere to
turn his thought, since he does not lay down a
constantly
selfsame form for each of the beings,
and he will thus utterly destroy our ability to
carry on discussion.
And the context of this statement is that of the negative
results
of the search noted above.
The suggestion is,
of
course,
that
further
search or a differently
organized
search will result in a defensible response to Z.
The next move made by Parmenides at 131C is not really
a move at all, for it suggests that participant individuals
have parts of the form(s) as shares.
It is not a move, for
the idea that a form is divided into parts is admission from
the start, as it were, that the form is many and not single
and selfsame.
Parmenides ends this little section by say
ing:
Then,
in what way, Socrates, will other
things
come
to have shares of these forms of yours,
if
they cannot have shares either as parts or wholes?
And so the stage is set for what Vlastos and others identify
as the TMA, and I now turn to that argument.
Part II: Parmenides 132A1-B2. THE SO-CALLED TMA
I shall
the passage,
translation,
tion of it
these shall I
132

first give an extremely literal translation of
then comment briefly on some features of
the
and then give what seems a natural interpreta
in its context.
Only after having completed
turn to Vlastos and his critics.

Parmenides
I think that it is for some such
reason as this that you believe that each form is
one. Whenever many things seem to you to be larg
es,
in like manner there seems some single idea
(appearance,
look) which, to you as you look at
(idonti) them, is the same in all of them.
Hence,
you take the large to be one.
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5 Sócrates

That's true.

Parmenides What of the large itself and the other
larges?
If in exactly the same way you were
in
; your m i n d ’s eye [literally, try means of tyour; soul]
to, look at ,them all, would not yet another
large
appear
to be one, by which all of these appear to
be larges?.
Socrates

So it seems.

IQ Parmenides Then another form of largeness will
make
its appearance, coming to be in addition
to
largeness and those, having shares of; it.
And yet
another besides all of these, by which they will
all bê larges.
And ,thus each of your forms will
by no means one, but rather an unlimited multi; tUde .
:

COMMENTS ON THE TRANSLATION

At 132A1, I translate the text as 'believe each form is
one*.
This is the literal reading of 'hen hekaston eidos
oiesthai
einal'. Cornford translates it as 'believing in a
single Form in each case'.[12]
Vlastos translates it as 'to
hold. that there exists one Form in each case *. In both of
these,
the reading of 'hekaston' as 'in each case' is egre
gious, for *hekaston’ obviously qualifies ' e i d o s * T h e ; mat- ;
ter is as such of little moment, except that the Cornford/Viastos
reading suggests that the point in question is
rather more "How can there be a form whenever there
is a
collection of like things?" than "Granted that
there ^ r e
forms, how' can a form be. one or single?".
.
132A contains the first use of *idea* in the dialogue.
The
standard word for form up to this point in the dialogue
has been
'eidos *. And this first use of 'idea' occurs in
immèà-iate!../‘çpnnec %ioä·./ wi tjh' 'idonti *--a dative participle
meaning (in context) 'to you as you look a t ’. 'Idea', which
is a form of the same verb', 'ideih* . has the primary meaning
of
'semblance', . 'appearance’, or ’look’. This connection
between
'idea* and 'idonti* suggests what might account for
the singularity of the form in the case of many like partic
ipant individuals is that they all look, the same or have the
"sains look".
Τ η this s a p connection, it should be noted
that a form of ’idein* is used again in line 132A7 for ex
pressing
thé "look"
one might have with his "soul"
or
"mind's eye".
,
I
I have used 'larges', to transíate *t_a me gal a ' . This is
in accordance . with Parmenides' agreement
at; 130E9-131A3,
allowing
participant
individuáis to have the names of the
forms of which they have shares* Thus any x which has a
share of F may be called an .*£* ; here, any participant;!
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individual which
called a ’large'.

has

a share of The Large Itself

may

be

INTERPRETATION
As noted earlier, the issue raised by Parmenides in the
section immediately preceding this one is that of a form’s
being one or single while many participant individuals have
either
the
whole or parts of the form as shares.
And
132
begins with
another approach to the same issue.
Perhaps
there may be another way— 'if you please, a metaphorical way-in which several participant individuals can intelligibly
be said to have shares of a form without making
the form
many.
What Parmenides suggests is that, whenever one looks
at many larges, he/she is presented with a single look which
is the same for all of the larges.
Thus this suggestion is
that,
for a number of participant individuals, all larges,
to have shares' of one and the same Large is for each of them
to present
one and the same idea
(appearance
or
look).
This, at first blush at least, seems to get around the prob
lem brought
on by having several
participant individuals
either
having the whole
or parts of the form as their
shares.
And it does not quickly transform into the "part”
account as did Socrates' earlier suggestion of the day.
The problem Parmenides finds with this suggestion lies,
if you will, in the logical grammar of the language of look
ing and appearing which permeates the passage.
Appearances
or looks would seem to lie on the side of what appears
to
one or what is looked at and not on the side of the seeing
or looking at. Appearances or looks are, at least linguis
tically,
objects of seeings and lookings at.
It ought to
make
sense,
therefore, for them to be seen or looked at.
Indeed, even in English, it is grammatically possible to see
a look, e.g., "Did you see the look on his face?".
Parmeni
des exploits this bit of logical grammar.
After
the initial formulation, with its to you as you
look at and the look, he proceeds at 132A6 to invoke the
same
logical
grammar for mind’s eye looking.
The
looking
this
time
is on the part of the soul (tei psychei) .
It
could hardly be a standard looking (i.e., visual), for one
obviously
cannot look at an appearance or look in the same
way in which he/she looks at larges (large things).
But, if
that appearance
or look is construed as an object,
it is
possible to exploit the logical grammar of looking and looks
in Parmenides’ way.
So Socrates is invited to have a "bymeans-of-his-soul" or "mind's eye" look at the several larges and the large look (the large idea— the purported form).
They are, by hypothesis, many, all of them "larges".
And,
by the same reasoning which got us the first look or idea
which is the same in all, we shall get another look or idea
which is the same in all of these. 1 Applying the same ex
ploitation
of the logical grammar of looks and appearance
talk, this process can be made to go on over and over again.
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so the form as look or idea turns out to be."for you
means one, but an unlimited multitude” .

by no

The: form is an "unlimited multitude” , if the argument
is sound, in that there is an indefinite number of entities,
all different
from each other, which can be named by
’The
Large I t s e l f . And thus the form-name does not name a sin
gle entity, as Socrates’ reply to Zeno requires.
It is worth reiterating that the ostensible purpose of
Parmenides’ questions right from the start.
,is to get clear
about
the notion of having a share, of a form.
The
reason
for the questions about having the whole pr part of the form
as a share is: to point out that participant individuals can
not literally
have shares of forms, i.e., in the way that
several, people might have shares of a fortune or a pumpkin
pie.
With that in mind, one may well read the ideas or
"looks"
argument as an attempt to understand having a :share
of a form by attending to the ordinary sense of *idea * as
appearance
or look.
Indeed, the shift in the dialogue from
the use of *eidos’ to the use of ’idea/, marking the first
occasion of the latter ’s use in t h e ftext, invites that read
ing . .
Socrates’ next attempt is to suggest that the form may
be a noema, a thought, which, properly, can be "nowhere else
than in souls" (132B4).
Socrates connects this with the
earlier
suggestion
of the idea by claiming that "that way
[i.e.,
by taking the form as a noema] each would be one and
would
longer be open to the objections which you have
just
now made"
(132B5-6).
I take this to mean that
forms as
thoughts do not allow for the indefinitely replicative pro
duction of ideas or appearances whi ch;the logical grammar of
looks and appears talk invites.
Parmenides disposes of the
noema suggestion by drawing a disjunctive distinction, each
disjunct of which is objectionable.
Taking noemata strictly
as thoughts-of-jc (whatever
x. may be) and assuming - that
participant
individuals have shares of these, he concludes
that
every such individual must, as participating or having
a share,
think. And that simply w o n ’t do. Assuming
that
every thought must be of something "which is one, which that
thought thinks placed in all, some idea [appearance, } look]
which is one" (132C3-4), the form will turn out to be this
thought-of and not the thought.
This disjunct requires that
there are thoughts (noemata) which are not
thought,
and,
with the reappearance of idea, there is the suggestion that
this disjunct
gets us back to the replicative problems
of
the "looks" account.
That these two attempts (i.e.,
idea and noema) at
supplying a sense to ’having a share’ and, perhaps,
’form’
are related to one another is beyond question.
Aside from
Sotrates’ claim that
the noema account would avoid the
problem of indefinite replication (which one disjunct of the
noema account
fails
to do), both the idea and the noema
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accounts are psychological or soul-related.
A look or an
appearance
is invariably to someone (as the text
insists)
who is looking or seeing.
Indeed, it is just this which
generates the indefinite
replication.
On the noema ac
count [133,
once we separate the confusion of thought and
thought-of which gives the account a specious plausibility,
we are left either with the unacceptable conclusion that all
things
think or with, in effect, the problems of the idea
account.
I believe that these psychological accounts serve
the same purpose as the wholes and parts as literal
shares
account,
namely that of clearing away underbrush before al
lowing Socrates to give the account which permeates the mid
dle dialogues, namely, th¿ "pattern/copy" account of 132C12133A6.
Since there is no indication from earlier dialogues
that Plato had seriously attempted to examine the intelligi
bility
of the notion of having a share of a form, there is
nothing demeaning
or odd about putting these underbrush
clearing attempts into the mouth of a very young Socrates.
VLASTOS AND HIS CRITICS
In his own reformulation of the argument (in "Plato's "Third
Man" Argument:
Text and Logic," Philosophical Quarterly,
1969, 289ff.) of his 1954 paper , Vlastos boils the 132A1-B2
argument down to the following steps
1 .If

a certain set of things share a given charac
ter then there exists a unique Form correspond
ing to that character; and each of these things
has
that character by participating
in that
Form, (p .290)

From this and the assumption that
la.

a, Jb, and c are JF,

he derives
lb . There exists
a unique Form (which we may call
"F-ness") corresponding to the character, F_, and
a, 1i, and _c are F by participating in F-ness.
(p. 291).
He reformulates the second step of the argument as:
2.If

a,
b_, and a, and F-ness are F,
then there
exists
a unique form (which we may call "F-ness
II")
corresponding to I?, but not identical with
JF-ness;
and ji, Jb, c_, and FJ-ness are JF by
participating in F-ness II.
(p. 291)

In order to affirm the antecedent of 2 ., Vlastos claims
to
need, in addition to la. and lb., what he calls "Self-Predi
cation" , v i z .,
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SPA

Form by participation in which anything has a,
certain
character must itself have that charac
ter. (p. 291)

But it is clearly not enough to be able to assert that a , J),
o-,
and F-ness are F, for one may agree to that and also to
1. without admitting to the need for yet another form,
Fness
II.
So Vlastos adds what he calls "Non-Identity17,
viz. ,
.
Nllf

anything has a given character by participat
ing in a Form, it cannot be identical with that
Form. (p. 291) -

;

And so there follows the consequent of 2, and :with it the
denial
of 1 . Vlastos' claim about the argument.comes
down .
to the insistence that one may not consistently hold to 1 .,
S P . and NI.
And this is clearly true.
Leaving many niceties of their accounts aside, Wilfrid
Sellars
and later Colin Strang[14] remove the inconsistency.
by substituting 'at least one form' for 'a unique form'
in
Vlastos'
1. This makes possible the generation of the re
quired regress along with SP and NT without
the incon
sistency.
Vlastos, in his 1969 reply to them,[15]
rejoins
(and I think correctly) that the text will not support -the
'at least
one Form' reading.
Others, notably R.E.
Allen,
Peter' Geach, and Julius Moravcsik, have entered the Vlastos
controversy, more or less on Vlastos'. own terms; [16]
As I
indicated at the outset, I shall not enter it, but .rather
deny
that Vlastos' formulation states the argument of Par
menides
132A1-B2.
Given the TRANSLATION COMMENTS and IN
TERPRETATION above,
my reasons for so doing should be pa
tent,; but it is worthwhile, I think to make some comments on
the Vlastos
formulation, especially since they purport
to
give the .sense of the actual text.
. First,; there is nothing in the text which requires
or
justifies the talk of things "sharing a given character" and
of "a unique Form corresponding to that; character."
There
is indeed talk of "many larges" and of an idea (look,
ap
pearance) which is one and "the same in all of them." Vlas
tos appears to construe the .··*idea* of the argument as naming
or indicating what he calls a character and not as naming or
indicating
the form. The earlier arguments
(concerning
having
the whole or part of the form as a share) do · allow
for participant individuals Which have shares of a form to
have
the name of the form.
But the notion of a "shared
character"
over and above the form of which the participant
individuals are said to have shares is an ontological impor
tation which,
if subjected to scrutiny, adds a gratuitous
problem to the already vexing one of giving some intelligi
ble sense to 'having shares of a form'.
Cornford[17]

used

the term 'immanent character'
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way of talking about the "shares" which participant individ
uals are supposed to have when "having shares of a form."
Such immanent characters— needed for the final argument
of
the Phaedo— are individuals (not "shared characters") which
may be or have "share opposites" just as the forms of which
fhèy are shares may be or have "form opposites".
Thus,
in
the Phaedo argument,
the hot in this fire
(an immanent
character)
will "flee or perish" rather than allow "a cold"
in its location.
The issue in the present argument of Par
menides
is one about
having shares of a form.
If one
follows Vlastos in assuming that there may also be such a
thing as having shares of a "character" (his
1 ., above),
there would then seem to be yet another one-many problem to
confront,
namely
that of how many participant
individuals
may be said to have shares of a "character."
There is not
the slightest hint in the text of this gratuitous problem.
Though I think that the "immanent characters" of Phaedo
are best thought of as individuals in the sense that the hot
in this fire cannot be identical with the hot in that fire,
it is compatible with the Phaedo text to thin of immanent
characters as entities which more than one participant indi
vidual may "have".
Thus a hot of a certain degree may be
"had" by more than one thing. What would add the gratuitous
problem would be thinking of a hot as something which sever
al participant
individuals
may have shares o f .
But the
present text in no way invites any talk about the shares of
immanent characters which participant Individuals may ha v e .
Its point is simply to consider a possible account of what
having a_ share of a form may b e .
Second,
the immediate context of the Parmenides argu
ment
is,
as we have seen, concern about how a form can be
one or single.
If it is not one or single, then Socrates'
reply to Zeno is in jeopardy.
Given that the attempt of the
present argument
is to try once more to defend the claim
that individuals may have shares of the form without requir
ing the form to be multiform, the idea of rescuing Plato
from Vlastos' charge of inconsistency by changing 'a unique
Form'
to 'at least one Form' is unsettling,
I sympathize,
of course,
with the desire to construe the argument which
Plato
puts
in Parmenides' mouth as at least a reasonably
good
one and have tried so to construe it. But
the con
struction
of the; argument as giving away at the outset what
Socrates
is trying hard to defend scarcely gives Plato more
credit than Vlastos' inconsistent premiss set.
It is difficult, in this connection, to understand why
Vlastos
follows Cornford in translating 'hekaston' as
'in
each case' rather than the more natural and straightforward
'each form to be One*.
Cornford misconstrues the argument
as one concerned with the "existence" of forms as such and
not with the problem óf non-multiplicity or oneness of the
form. Vlastos follows Cornford in so translating, though my
guess is that his reason for doing so is his having
the
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"character/form" distinction in the back of his mind.
Thus,
in paraphrase (of Vlastos' 1.):
"Whenever a certain set of
things share a given character, then there exists a single
or unique form for èach such case."
Third, Vlastos’ re-statement of the argument completely
ignores
the "to you as you look at" and "look at with your
soul"
(or "in your mi nd ’s eye") parts of the text.
In his
1956 paper,[18] Vlastos speaks of an "epistemological” 'ver-,
sion of the argument, paralleling the "ontological" formula
tion
given in his 1954 paper. While this ta l k ·of an "epis
temological" version
speaks somewhat to my concern,
the
treatment of "look at", etc. as incidental to the "logic" of
the argument requires that the text— and Plato— be patron
ized .
For Parmenides plainly uses these terms
as though
they were crucial to the introduction of, at least, the sec
ond "large".
And the juxtaposition of ’idea' and
'idonti'
at the beginning is prima facie at least as crucial to the
introduction of the first "large".
It is, of course, philologically
undesirable and, perhaps, detrimental to discern
ing Plato's intentions to choose an interpretation which
patronizes
the text unless the text is, in itself
and in
context, impenetrable.
Fourth, I agree that something akin to "self-predication"
is required .by the argument. The Large Itself
(qua
look or idea) must be the sort of thing which
you could
"look at with your soul"— along with the .other larges.
In
turn, the large which "appears to be one" in that egregious
glimpse must also· be "lookable-at" along with
the other
larges.
And so o n , As I would read the argument, however,
the moral is not to be found in exploiting any of the stand
ard worries
about
self-predication. It is rather
to be
found
in recognizing that, if one thinks of a Socratic: form
as the "look" or "appearance" of things looked at,
he/she
will
have
to think of the form as psychological and,
lin
guistically,
caught up in the associations, of 'looks’ , ’ap
pears',
and their kin.
There is no evidence in the text of
apy attempt to arrive at or >exhibit a contradiction or, in
consistency— as Vlastos says, that it does, in f inding his 1.,
S P , and NÍ an inconsistent se’f. Obviously, however,: ,it is
part
of Parmenides’ point to claim that Socrates'
cannot,
without
inconsistency, maintain that each form is one or
single
and also that the form is the look (idea) of things
looked a t .
The Parmenides 132 passage h a s , on the face of i t ,
following form:
a.

x.i , x 2 , etc . all have shares of Fy «
There is ,
a certain single idea,or look, namely, Îq which is
in or of all of them.
;

b.

χ,Ι» X.2 * etc · » and Fj are all fs (the former being
"named after" F j , the latter being, what they are
15
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Mnamed after").
c.

Since they are all fs, there must be another idea
or look, namely, F 2 which is in or of Χχ , x.2 , etc.
and in or of Fj.

d.

And so on through F 3 , etc.

a. does the work of Vlastos' 1., la., and lb.
b. does the
work of Vlastos* 2. But b. does not require SP as Vlastos
states
it in order to get the argument going.
It requires
only
the assumption that x 1 , x.2» et e· all have Fj in or of
them and that the participant individuals and the form are
all fs.
c. does, in its way,
incorporate NT,
i.e., it
requires another idea for jcχ , x^ » etc., and £χ , namely, F 2 .
Vlastos*
statement of the argument, as we have noted,
takes
the argument as leading to contradiction or inconsis
tency.
In context, however, the only inconsistency noted is
that of maintaining
the form to be one while construing
having a. share as having n single idea or look and allowing
the idea to be itself looked at (and thus itself having an
idea or look).
The problem with the Vlastos*
formulation
is,
I believe, the intrusion of the common "character**.
As
I noted earlier, this requires a double sharing— once in the
character
and once in the form.
All that the text requires
is that the initial larges and the idea which is in or of
them be all construed as larges with yet another idea which
is in or of them. The upshot of Parmenides* actual argument
is the inconsistency of (i) maintaining that having a share
of a; certain form is having a certain idea or look, (ii)
maintaining that than any given idea or look can also have a
share of a form though not of itself, and (iii) maintaining
that the form is one or single.
Part III: ARISTOTLE AND THE TMA
Aristotle's only extended statement of the Third Man
Argument
is in Sophistical Refutations 178b37-179all.
In
presenting
it,
I have translated 'tode t i ' by 'this thing
here*
and intend its finding application in the
juxtaposi
tion of the demonstrative, the token reflexive, and various
"thing"
or "substance" terms, as in 'this man here',
’this
horse here*, etc.
There
is also the argument that there is a third
man over and above man and the individuals.
For
neither man nor any other common signifies a this
thing here but rather how qualified, with respect
to what, in what manner, or other such.
Likewise
in the
case of Coriscus and cultured Coriscus—
are they the same or different?
For the one sig
nifies a this thing here, the other how quali
fied— but the latter in such a way that it is not
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[grammatically]
set apart.
It is not the setting
apart which makes the third man, but the joining
together
as the this thing her e. For
the very
thing which Callias is and also the very
thing
which man is will not both be this thing he re .
Even
if one were to say that the set apart is not
the very thing which this thing here is but is
rather
the very thing which how qualified is,
it
would make no difference.
For there would
still
be a one in addition to the many,
for example,
man.
It is clear therefore that it must not be
granted
that what is predicated commonly of many
is a this thing here, but rather that it signifies
how qualified, or with respect to,, or how much or
many, or some such.
The
structure and the point of the argument are,
des
pite
some textual obscurity, fairly clear.
The passage as
sumes that there are basic individuals, which Aristotle gets
at most
characteristically by means of ’this thing here"
(tode ti)
both here and in Metaphysics Zeta.
And the
passage denies that a common term as such (whether in predi
cate position or juxtaposed with a proper name) gets at or
signifies a this thing here.
The argument of this and other
passages is of a piece with Aristotle's doctrine of pros hen
ambiguity, i.e., that the various "being" terms in the acci
dent categories do not signify in their own right but only
as indirectly signifying this thing here.'s. Aristotle needs
both common terms, e.g., m a n , and individual terms,
e.g.»
Coriscus.
Let the individual term be the first man and the
common term the second man.
What Aristotle denies is that
the common
term is a special individual and that there
is
needed yet a third man to be predicated of both it and the
individual.
In his accounting, there is really only the
individual;
the second man is simply a picturesque way of
talking about the function of a common term.
The third man
puzzle arises when one confuses the function of a common
term with
that of an individual term, thus taking man
or
cultured
to be a this thing he re .
Obviously
one needs
individual
and common terms to get on with discourse,
but
taking the latter as also individual terms adds a perplexing
one in addition to the many,
Aristotle’s comment about a third man at Metaphysics
1038b35-1039a3 is obviously of a piece with the passage from
Sophistical Refutations.
It occurs in Zeta in connection
with a series of arguments to show that the universal
(to
katholou) cannot be ousia (substance, tode ti):
From these [arguments, considerations] it is quite
clear
that none of those holding universally
is
ousia and that none of those predicated
commonly
signifies
this thing her e, but rather how quali
fied.
Otherwise, there are many other consequenc
es including the third man.
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Even as the two passages just cited hang together,
so
also does another from Metaphysics (990b16-18) and Alexan
der's comment on it, the latter allegedly taken from Afistotle’s (lost) On the Forms. The Metaphysics passage is:
Of thé more precise arguments, some make forms of
relatives to j pros t.i'sl for which we say there is
ho kind fgenos] just by itself, others formulate
the third man.
The arguments, of course, are arguments for Platonic forms.
Alexander's alleged quotation makes clear, I believe,
what
sort of "precise argument" may be in question.
The
third man proof is as follows.
If a term is
truly predicated of many, and if it is other than
those
of which it is predicated, then it is sepa
rate
from them.
(This is what those who lay down
the forms believe they show.
The reason given for
there
being Man Itself over and against the men
is:
That a man is really predicated of the indi
vidual men who áre man, and it is other than the
individual men,)· But if this is so, there will be
a third man.
For if a man predicated of them is
other than those of which it is predicated, and if
it stands alone, and if man is predicated both of
the individuals and of the form, there will be a
third man in addition to the individuals and the
form.
And thus a fourth, predicated of this and
of the form and of the individuals, and likewise
also a fifth, and so on· indefinitely.
Alexander Aphrodisias, Commentary on Met
aphysics . 62(1.33)-63(1.9)
The second sentence of the above states what appears to be a
"precise"
argument for forms (i .e ., for "separate"
forms) .
Aristotle's Claim is that, if Man Itself is separated from
the individual men, then, since the individuals and Man It
self are both mèn, a "third" man will be predicable
(and
thus separate from them) of both— à "fourth" of those three,
a "fifth" of the resulting four, and so on.
I think that
Aristotle
(and Alexander) grants that the "second" is other
than the "first", but he denies that it follows from this
that the "second" is separate"from the "first".
If we think
it is separate— as do those who "lay'down the forms"— we
have the third man regress on our hands.
The
pattern of thèse Aristotelian references is clear
enough.
Start with an individual, a tode ti , sáy, this man
here or, if you please, Goriscusi
Let a term be predicated
of that
individual,
say, M a n . If Man is construed
as a
common term, and is in no way taken as signifying an indi
vidual,
then Aristotle finds no problem.
B u t , if Man is
18
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taken as somehow signifying an individual (in the relevant
case,
a form), then, since both Coriscus and Man are in
dividuals,
it must, be possible to predicate Man of them
both.
And
the Man predicated of both of them will,
of
course,
be a third M a n , If it,
in turn,
signifies an
individual,
we will need yet a fourth Man to be predicated
of it and the other "men".
And so on.
As I noted earlier, this argument is similar in some
respects to the Parmenides "Large" argument.
Both arguments
depend upon somehow construing a common term as an individu
al and then counting it and the individuals to which it is
common as in need of yet another term to be common to them,
and so o n .
But the similarity is ho more than skin-deep, and the
Aristotelian argument offers no real clue to the interpreta
tion of the Parmenides "Large" argument.
In particular, it
offers
no clue
to the "looking" (idein) features of the
"Large"
argument and thus to the principle which generates
the regress.
In the Metaphysics Zeta passage and, I think,
in the Sophistical Refutations passage, Aristotle
is at
pains
to argue that the universal (to katholou) cannot bef
this thing here (tode ti) . .The upshot is patent in the very
definition
of the universal äs what holds for many and the
requirement that this thing here be individual.
The regress
of Aristotle’s argument is generated by violating the defin
itional requirement and by the demand for another universal
to hold for the individual and the product of the violation.
There
is as more reason to identify the pattern/copy
argument
of Parmenides 132D-133A with the Aristotelian TMA.
In the pattern/copy argument, however, the problem comes
with requiring
pattern and copy to be likes and
then
treating
likeness as having a share of a_ common form. Once
again,
there
is indefinite generation of forms.
In this
case the formal similarity to Aristotle’s TMA is closer, for
the generation of fresh forms is straightforwardly analogous
to generation by the need of fresh common terms.
What
one suspects, of course, is that the arguments of
Parmenides were lying about for handy appropriation by Ar
istotle
(and,
perhaps, others).
Given his coming up with
the conceptions
of individual and common; terms which lie
behind
parts
(at least) of the Organon, the adaptation
of
such arguments seems very likely indeed. [19] As there is no
special
reason
to think of him as interested in finding a
sense for ’metechein * which provides a satisfactory response
to Zeno,
the TMA becomes a polemical weapon rather than a
means of sophisticating a basic Platonic doctrine.[20]
In
terestingly
enough,
the tortured pages of Zeta not only
evoke the TMA;
they also attempt to meet the demand for
form in the thing. In that-attempt-; I; believe,
Aristotle
comes perilously close to the Platonism of the late dia
logues. [21]
But that invites another story and another pa19
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per.
I can hint at that story by pointing out that Aristo
tle's doctrine of universals is kin to Socrates' suggestion
in Parmenides that
forms might be construed as noeroata.
Once one gets Aristotle away from the ambiguity of individu
al and common terms (words? thoughts? things?), thé problem
of what the universals or noemata are o_f requires something
like that· form/matter doctrine of Metaphysics. And á case
can be made for taking that doctrine as one way of coping
with the basic problem of Parmenides.f221
Part IV:

SUMMATION

I have attempted to show that the "Large" argument
of
Parmenides
132 must be understood as part of the attempt to
clarify Socrates' response to Zeno.
As such, the threat to
that
response
is to the requirement that each form be one
and not many.
But it is also, of course, a threat to the
very idea
of having a share of a form.
In context,
the
argument
is underbrush clearing, getting an unworkable idea
out of the way.
Indeed, the first part of Parmenides gets
several such unworkable
ideas out Of the way,
the
idea
thesis being only one.
Formally. Parmenides starts with the
Zeno challenge (what I have1called '.Z,', goes on to Socrates'
response,
then moves to Parmenides' criticism of thät
re
sponse.
The upshot of that criticism is not the abandonment
of the Forms.
Indeed, as we have noted, even Parmenides is
made to insist that, without them, "our ability to carry on
discussion" will be destroyed. What one is naturally led to
expect
from the first part of Parmenides is sophistication
of the doctrine of forms and having shares to meet Z and the
arguments
put in the mouth of Parmenides.
And, when Socra
tes, at the end of the first part^expresses bewilderment as
to where he is to go from here, Parmenides informs him that
he needs
exercise (gymnastike) in the method practiced
by
Zeno
and proceeds to give him a lengthy example with "his
own" supposition, "If One is".[23]
The placement of the 132 "Large" argument in the full
text of Parmenides
depends very much upon one's under
standing
of the objective(s) of the whole dialogue.
If one
thinks, as I do, that the effort is to sophisticate the doc
trine
of forms to meet the predication problems
posed
by
Zeno,he/she will
indeed think of the "Large" argument
as
rejection of a prima facie possibility for meeting
those
problems
on the way to a successful meeting of the prob
lems .[24]
If one thinks that Plato is prepared to defend
Socrates' response to Zeno to the death, he/she is likely to
look for the errors in Parmenides' arguments in the first
part.
But even in the latter case, one is Obliged to fit
the "Large" argument into the context of Parmenides'
ques
tioning of Socrates and to pay close attention to details of
the text.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Gregory Vlastos, "The Third Man Argument in. The Parmenides
Philosophical Review 63 (1954), 319-49.
2.
See Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Princeton: University Press,
1973), 361-2, for a partial· but useful listing..
3. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysic,
62,29-33. Translated and quoted in the "DIGRESSION" of Part I, below.
4. Sophistical· Refutations 178b37-179all.
at the .beginning of Part III, below.;

Translated and quoted

5. One might restate Z; somewhat as follows. Suppose there to be
just three things, A, B, and C. Suppose further that, using them, one
attempts predication.
Thus one might assert that A is B*
But, of
course, A is A. Unless one trivializes by taking the terms to be dif
ferent names for a single thing (contrary to hypothesis), he/she will
have to say something, like "Insofar as A is B it is unlike itself and
like B; but insofar as A is A_ it is like itself and unlike B." If this
procedure is repeated for: the combinations of A, B, and £, we may think
of it as involving the assumption that many are and as leading to the
conclusion that they are likes and unlikes (both themselves and the
others). If this procedure is protested as not properly being predica
tion but rather identity. the response is a challenge to come up with an
intelligible account of predication. Socrates attempts one by saying
that, for example and schematically, A could have a share of B without
its being B.
With this construal Of predication, things could be
"sharingly" likes and unlikes without,any such impossibility as that the
same thing must be both like and unlike itself and another.
p. See R.E. Allen, Plato's PARMENIDES (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1983), 106-7. It is worth noting, as Allen does, that
the forms in question figure as the forms repeatedly used in,the several
versions of the "One Supposition" in the second part of the dialogue*
One can think of these as the forms to be investigated by dialectic as
suggested by the account of noesis in the analogy of the line in Re
public VI.
7. See fn. 5 above, I have argued [in "Zeno’s Stricture and Pred
ication in Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus," forthcoming in How Things
Are, ed. J. Bogen and J. McGuire (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983)]" that the
later dialogues of Plato suggest that Plato takes seriously the idea
that, in predication, the two terms name the same thing. What saves
this idea from triviality is (a) the:recognition of names having wider
or narrower scope and (b) the recognition that things in the world of
becoming can, in virtue of their complex structure, be subject to dif
ferent (form) names. The making of this argument is a bit involved and
assumes that Plato solves the problems raisedin Parmenides in a par
ticular way.

8. See Alexander Nehamas, "Self-Predication and Plato’s Theory, of
Forms," American Philosophical Quarterly. Vol, 16, No. 2, 1979, 93-103*
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9» The difference here being highlighted is, of course, that ex
ploited by Aristotle in Categories by distinguishing "predicated of"
from "present in". English, unlike Attic Greek, uses the indefinite
article to mark the former usage, as in 'Jones is _a man'. The doctrine
of "having a share" simply will not work at all for "is a(n)" predica
tion. Thus Plato's examples in earlier dialogues are almost uniformly
of what Strawson would call "characterizing" predications (if you wish,
"is" predications).
10. As I understand the doctrines of Theaetetus and Tiaaeus, the
physical world is made up of the Platonic regular solids configured in
various ways.
These have, individually and in configuration, shape,
size, motion, position, etc.— the "mathematical qualities". But they do
not in themselves have the "sense qualities". The objects of aisthesis— the aestheta— are actually physical qualities, but qualities which
exist only as the result of interaction of sense organs (which are them
selves physical) and the surrounding physical environment. The sugges
tion that there are no forms for dirt, hair, etc. is, I think, the sug
gestion that there is no regular form configuration which their physical
counterparts embody. It is pretty clear that the Plato of Timaeus and
Philebus is prepared to recognize forms for all manner configurations,
and that may be the point of Parmenides’ patronizing remark about Soc
rates' later sophistication.
11.
more the
was not
man that

Both terms are used frequently by Plato, 'metalambanein' having
sense of coming to have a share of. Plate's metaphorical usage
original to him. It was common, e.g., to say of a courageous
he has a share of (metèchei) courage.

12. F.M. Cornford, Plato ¿nd Parmenides (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1936), 87.
13. It is interesting to note that the noema account is formally
similar to Aristotle’s account of "universals" (ta katholou)♦ Aristotle
is prepared to treating universals that those holding for many änd to
deny, more or less on that ground, that the universal can be ousia or
tode ti. This, of course, gives him the problem of saying what it is in
things which makes possible the applicability of universals. And meet
ing this problem fills some of the most tortured pages of Metaphysics.
14. Wilfrid S. Sellars, "Vlastos and 'The Third Man,'" Philosophi
cal Review 64 (1955), 405-37; "Vlastos and 'The Third lían': A Rejoin
der," Philosophical Perspectives (Springfield, IL, 1957), 55-72. Colin
Strang, "Plato and the Third Man," Proceedings of the Aristotelian So
ciety, Supp. Volume 37 (1963), 147-64.
15.
G. Vlastos, "Plato's "Third Man" Argument (Parin. 132A1-B2):
Text and Logic," Philosophical Quarterly 19 (1969), 289-301. Reprinted
in G. Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Princeton: University Press, 1973),
342-61.
16.
R.E. Allen, "Participation and Predication in Plato's Middle
Dialogues," Philosophical Review 69 (1960), 147-64;
P. Geach, "The
Third Man Again," Philosophical Review 65 (1956), 72-8; Julius Morav22
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csik, "The 'Third Man* Argument and Plato's Theory of Forms," Fhronesis
8 (1963), 50-62.
17.

Cornford, op. cit, 78ff.

18. G. Vlastos, "Postcript to the TMA: A Reply to Mr. Geach," Phi
losophical Review 65 (1956), 83-94.
19. This is, of course, highly speculative.
But Aristotle's dis
tinction between individual and common terms is not, and the insistence
upon individuals as ontological bedrock is not. Posterior Analytics I I ,
for example, is especially insistent on the redundancy of forms as prin
ciples of explanation once one has clearly grasped the difference be
tween individual and common terms and the use of definitory formulae as
middles. The straightforward use of the difference in the TMA formula
tion in Sophistical Refutations is highly significant.
20. Cf. Metaphysics 987bll-15, "[Plato] simply changed the name to
participation fmethexis]. For, whereas the Pythagoreans say that the
beings are by imitation Γmimesis] of the numbers, Plato says by
participation fmethexisl, changing the name.
As to what either
participation or imitation may be, they jointly neglected to search
out." Since Aristotle is fairly scathing in such comments as this one,
and since he has what he takes to ..be. a successful and- alternative ac·* ...
count of predication, he betrays no interest in sophisticating methexis
to meet obvious objections.
21. As I read those later dialogues, they take take forms to be, as
suggested earlier in the paper, principles of structure and participant
individuals to be structured things, though they continue to recognize
the separation of principles of structure.
(See R.G. Turnbull, "Know
ledge and the Forms in the Later Platonic Dialogues," Proceedings and
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1978, 735-58.)
I
say that Aristotle comes "perilously close" in that he is obviously pre
pared to recognize form as shared by many things and allows for human
beings to take on the forms of things without their matter.
22.

See fns. 21 and 13 above.

23. As I read the so-called "second part" of Parmenides, the "ex
ercise" (gymnastike) which Socrates is alleged to need is primarily in
the adumbration of the logical space of all of the forms, thus rather
like the task of dialectic in the doubly-divided line of Republic. The
necessary frame (or logical space) of inquiry must make provision for
the interrelationships of forms, their source in the one which i s , and
the possibility of both forms and individuals sharing structure(s) with
forms. With some such frame in place, a rationale can be provided for
the sort of research which Plato puts under the heading of collection
(synagoge) and division (diairesis) and illustrates profusely in, e.g.,
Statesman.
24.
See fn. 23. What must be added, though the defense of it far
exceeds the scope of this paper, is the idea that to have a share of a*
form is (a), in the case of forms, to be a specification of a principle
of structure or (b), in the case of individuals, to embody a principle
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of structure. For a start on the task of explaining and defending this
idea5 see my "Knowledge and the Forms in the Later Platonic Dialogues,"
cited in fn. 21.
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